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Executive summary 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development – institutionalized 
transboundary interactions between public and private actors aiming at the provision 
of collective goods – are a central element of contemporary sustainability governance, 
in particularly since the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD). They have been credited with closing the participation and implementation 
gap in sustainable development but also accused of privileging powerful interests and 
thereby consolidating the privatisation of governance and dominant neo-liberal modes 
of globalisation. 
This report has surveyed recent scholarship to provide an evidence-based assessment 
of the performance of multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development with 
a view towards identifying the building blocks for successful and effective partnerships 
across a number of concrete implementation contexts and specific functions. While the 
overall aggregate performance of partnerships as a governance instrument is mixed at 
best, we identify and discuss nine building blocks that increase the likelihood for 
success: leadership, partners, goal setting, funding, management, monitoring, meta-
governance, problem structure and socio-political context. Three main conclusions are 
drawn in this report:  
1. Already in the planning and start-up phase, the likelihood for success can be 
enhanced by investing sufficient time and resources in formulating common goals, 
ambitions and visions, identifying and attracting the relevant partners, and 
setting-up mechanisms for dealing with dispute settlement among the partners. 
Once these preconditions have been met, the partners must ensure an effective 
management, allocate adequate resources for process management, and devise 
smart funding structures to ensure a sustained flow of resources. Monitoring, 
reporting and evaluation are key parts of the procedure to create internal and 
external legitimacy, show-case successful implementation and identify and learn 
from mistakes. Throughout the entire process, the partnership must adapt to a 
changing environment and social and political context. Consequently, leadership is 
a central element during the entire partnership process. 
2. Function matters to how partnerships should be designed and implemented. By 
and large, service providing partnerships, such as the GAVI Alliance (GAVI), the 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), and the Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), demand larger financial and human resources and 
more knowledge about political and social contexts than knowledge transfer and 
standard-setting partnerships (such as the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative, EITI), since the former’s implementation on the ground is highly 
resource intensive. These insights are particularly useful for setting priorities when 
allocating scarce resources (see section 3.2). 
3. Improved political oversight (preferable at the level of the United Nations) is 
essential to improve the credibility and effectiveness of the entire UN approach to 
sustainable development. A main conclusion from the evaluation of the WSSD’s 
Type II Partnerships has been that the lack of monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms severely limits partnership effectiveness at an aggregate level. This is 
not only bad news for the effectiveness and overall performance of multi-
stakeholder partnerships but also for the legitimacy and trust-worthiness of the 
UN brand. Therefore, improved monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are 
urgently needed and we suggest developing safe-guards in the form of minimum 
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criteria, building on some of the nine building blocks. For example, partnerships 
should be conducive to commonly agreed global norms such as human rights and 
sustainable development. 
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1 Introduction 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development are often portrayed as a 
vital new element of the emerging system of global sustainability governance. In policy 
and academic debates alike, partnerships are promoted as a solution to deadlocked in-
tergovernmental negotiations, to ineffective development cooperation and overly 
bureaucratic international organisations, to self-centred state policies, corrupt elites 
and many other real or perceived current problems of the sustainability transition. 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships were promoted in particular at the 2002 Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), where they emerged as a ‘Type II 
outcome’ of the summit, along with the traditional, ‘Type I outcomes’ of the 
intergovernmental diplomatic process. While at its peak more than 340 partnerships 
for sustainable development have been officially registered with the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), many more are active across the 
globe but not formally registered. 10 years after the WSSD, the 20th United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) reaffirmed the central role for 
partnerships. More recently, the preparatory work for a new post-2015 development 
agenda replacing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has also reiterated the 
importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships to implement sustainable development 
(UN 2014a). 
And yet, the role and relevance of partnerships for sustainable development remains 
contested. Some observers view the new emphasis on multi-stakeholder or inter-
sectoral partnerships – also referred to as public-private partnerships (see Bitzer, 
Francken, and Glasbergen 2008; Morsink, Hofman, and Lovett 2011) – as problematic, 
since voluntary public-private governance arrangements might privilege more powerful 
actors, in particular ”the North” and ”big business”, and consolidate the privatisation of 
governance and dominant neo-liberal modes of globalization. Others argue that 
partnerships lack accountability and (democratic) legitimacy (Meadowcroft 2007). Yet 
others see multi-stakeholder partnerships as an innovative form of governance that ad-
dresses deficits of inter-state politics by bringing together key actors of civil society, 
governments and business (e.g. Benner, Streck, and Witte 2003; Reinicke et al. 2000; 
Streck 2004). In this perspective, public-private partnerships or similar governance 
networks for sustainable development are important new mechanisms to help resolve 
a variety of current governance deficits. 
This report summarizes existing scholarship on multi-stakeholder partnerships for 
sustainable development with a view towards identifying the building blocks for 
successful and effective partnerships across a number of concrete implementation 
contexts and specific functions. To this end, we first describe the rise of partnerships 
in governance for sustainable development and survey the existing literature to 
present a partnership typology and elicit the central themes that occupy researchers, 
including effectiveness and legitimacy. Second, we describe and discuss nine building 
blocks that increase the likelihood of a successful partnership. Third, an overview is 
given on how to prioritize resources and attention depending on partnership type. 
Fourth and finally, we wrap up the study with a checklist for designing and 
implementing a successful multi-stakeholder partnership for sustainable development. 
The discussions and the results of the study are based on an extensive literature 
review (see literature list) and supported by 6 in-depth case studies including Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), the Renewable Energy and 
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Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to reduce 
short-lived climate pollutants (CCAC), and the German Food Partnership (GFP) (See 
Annex 1). 
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2 State-of-the-art: research on multi-stakeholder 
partnerships 
2.1 Definitions and typology 
The term “partnership” has been used by practitioners and scholars to describe just 
about any type of collaboration between state and non-state actors. Before taking 
centre stage in Global Governance and International Relations (IR) scholarship in the 
early 2000s, multi-stakeholder partnerships have enjoyed sustained attention in 
domestic policy, in areas ranging from health to infrastructure and urban services. 
Public-private partnerships have been promoted as an instrument to increase 
governance effectiveness as part of New Public Management (NPM) that gained ground 
in the early 1980s. Since the 1990s, partnerships at the international level have been 
promoted as tools for good governance, increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
multilateral policies. However, despite this longstanding tradition of partnership 
research, the vast and growing literature on public-private partnerships suffers from 
conceptual confusion, competing definitions, disparate research traditions and a 
normative and value-laden agenda of promoting partnerships. This state of conceptual 
vagueness has led some scholars to dismiss the term partnership as “conceptually 
empty and merely politically expedient” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011, 31). 
However, the conceptual vagueness of the term has not prevented a prolific literature 
on these novel entities of global governance. Multi-stakeholder partnerships, both 
national and transnational, have been analysed in multiple ways as hybrid governance 
arrangements for the provision of collective goods that lead to the transfer of political 
authority from government and public actors towards non-state actors, such as 
business and civil society organisations (CSOs). In this report, we are focusing on 
multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development as a form of global 
governance beyond traditional forms of international, multilateral cooperation. 
Despite the lack of a broadly agreed definition of this phenomenon, most scholars 
agree on several features that constitute multi-stakeholder partnerships. Important 
shared characteristics of partnerships include: transnationality (involving cross-border 
interactions and non-state relations); public policy objectives (as opposed to public 
bads or exclusively private goods); and a network structure (coordination by 
participating actors rather than coordination by a central hierarchy). Following 
Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan (2009, 455), we define transnational multi-stakeholder 
partnerships as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and 
private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods.” 
The study thus explicitly excludes national or local-level partnerships as well as project 
level PPPs. For example, PPP’s are often set up as a financial construction between 
governments and companies to deliver a project – often related to infrastructure – such 
as building a bridge or railway (Mol 2007). These are popular among the large 
development and financial institutions such as the World Bank and the UN and are 
today common place when implementing development policy and distributing aid 
money. However, they differ substantially from the multi-stakeholder partnerships 
since the latter are more collaborative and include civil society (often in form of CSOs), 
address global/international issues, rely on trust and interdependency, resource 
exchange and reciprocity to change behaviour, and often employ non-hierarchical 
decision-making procedures (Mol 2007; Stoker 1999) instead of multilateral 
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agreements or market solutions, which are based on rules, chains of commands, 
coercion, price signals, contracts and property rights (Stoker 1999). 
The wide diversity in partnerships has challenged researchers to agree on a common 
typology. For instance, Pattberg and colleagues show how the Type II partnerships 
could be categorized by geographical representation and scope, issue area, 
membership constellations, lead partners, and governance function (2012). Van 
Huijstee and colleagues divide the academic literature on partnerships into 
institutionalist and actor-centred perspectives (2007). Institutionalists, the authors 
argue, look at partnerships as a new phenomenon and discuss their functions and 
place in the wider global governance structure asking questions about power and 
coherence. Actor-centred perspectives in contrast take a more instrumental and 
technocratic approach, focusing on the micro level of institutional design to create a 
successful partnership. 
Overall, governance function has perhaps been the most popular category used to 
create typologies. Witte, Streck and Brenner for example, suggest that one can 
differentiate between partnerships for negotiation, coordination and implementation 
(2003). Beisheim and Liese (2011) define three types of partnerships: service 
provision/implementation; knowledge transfer/learning and standard setting. Based 
on Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen we can identify another important function 
namely meta-governance defined as “strategic steering and coordination of the 
governance system” (2007, 409). These are partnerships governing other partnerships, 
institutions or initiatives such as the ISEAL Alliance, which is a global multi-stakeholder 
partnership with the explicit goal to develop good practices for developing and 
increasing the positive impacts of sustainability standards. While we believe this to be 
an important theoretical observation, the meta-governance type of partnership is very 
limited and therefore excluded from our typology. 
The table below provides an overview of the three dominant functions of partnerships 
and a useful typology capturing most partnerships. We also use this typology here to 
structure our building blocks discussed in chapter 3. 
Table 2.1 Type of multi-stakeholder partnership 
Type Description Examples 
Service 
provision/implementation 
Supporting to implement 
multilateral agreements and 
goals; Regulating state or other 
actors’ behaviour 
Global Fund 
Knowledge transfer Generate, exchange and spread 
knowledge and expertise  
Global Water Partnership 
Standard setting 
Establish new rules and norms 
World Commission on 
Dams; Forest Stewardship 
Council; 
 
2.2 A brief history 
Transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships entered the international scene during 
the 1990’s as a new and innovative governance tool (compared to traditional 
intergovernmental cooperation). Today, partnerships exist in almost all global issue 
areas including environment, health, development cooperation, social rights and 
security (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). We highlight two aspects to explain 
their popularity. First, during the 1990’s neoliberals claimed that the sole solution to 
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global governance was an unfettered market solving problems by the help of an 
invisible hand. This idea however, faded with the demise of conservative governments 
in the UK and the US and could be described as a “market failure” in solving global 
problems. Second, there was a general feeling that the process and implementation of 
multilateral agreements did not have the desired impact. This was interpreted as “state 
failure” to address pressing global problems. Since markets and states failed to deliver 
collective goods, other solutions were needed and flexible, adaptable, and 
decentralized multi-stakeholder partnerships promised an attractive alternative to 
traditional public policy and often cumbersome interstate negotiations. 
A proposition that married the neoliberal discourse of effectiveness, efficiency and 
market-based solutions with the legitimacy, collaboration and participation of state-
based solutions was the concept of New Public Management (NPM). In fact, much of 
the rationale behind partnerships was borrowed from the NPM wave hitting national 
public administrations during the 1980s (Bäckstrand et al. 2012; Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff 2011), bringing private sector management principles to the public sector 
(Kjær 2004). NPM reflected the belief that the public sector should become more 
efficient and employ “market-based” solutions but also to be more accountable to their 
citizens and collaborative in character, i.e. a hybrid solution to market- and state 
failure. Multi-stakeholder partnership between state and non-state actors embodied 
much of the aspirations behind NPM by promising to tap into the resources and 
knowledge of non-state actors yet retaining the legitimacy of the state (Börzel and 
Risse 2005). In this sense, partnerships could kill two birds with one stone. Utting and 
Zammit sum it up by arguing that partnerships ”are a response not only to market 
failure, but also to state failure – the perceived or real inability of governments, 
particularly in developing countries, to be effective agents of regulation and 
development, and providers of essential goods and services” (2009, 42). 
Other factors are also likely to have played a role in the rise of partnerships. For 
instance, non-state actors such as companies and CSOs started to warm-up to the idea 
of collaboration instead of confrontation (Chan and Müller 2012). Also, the rise of 
internet and technological developments in ICT facilitated more non-state activity by 
substantially lowering the costs for communication and coordination across large 
distances. 
The growth of multi-stakeholder partnerships as a governance tool has not been 
without its critics. A common objection is that they are a neoliberal construction 
invented to increase the power of private interest in global affairs, in particular in the 
developing world (Zammit 2003). Some claim that UN-sponsored partnerships is a way 
to invite special interest into the UN, boost corporatism, and allow the private sector to 
make use of the UN’s good name while merely paying lip-service to the goals they set 
out. For example, the UN’s Global Compact, which is the UN’s high-profile corporate 
governance partnership, has repeatedly being accused of “blue-washing” meaning that 
corporations make use of the UN’s good name by signing up to a number of principles 
they never intend to follow (Bruno and Karliner 2000). Some developing countries have 
also been weary of giving partnerships too much attention and accused developed 
nations of shifting responsibility for funding away from traditional Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). They emphasize that partnerships should be 
understood as complementary to ODA, not as a substitute. 
Despite the critique, multi-stakeholder partnerships have become an integral part of 
policy implementation at the UN level. At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
Agenda 21 was adopted, which called for a “Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development” and repeatedly alluded to multi-stakeholder partnerships between 
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“public, private and community sectors” in its recommendations on how to implement 
sustainable development (UNCED 1992). The message from Rio was reiterated 10 
years later at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. 
During the WSSD, so called “Type II” or “Johannesburg” partnerships emerged as a 
central delivery mechanism to implement sustainability related goals. In conjunction 
with the WSSD, a registry was set up under the auspices of the UN’s Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) where partnerships could register themselves and 
become an official partnership for sustainable development. In 2012, the database was 
expanded to include both partnerships and commitments made by stakeholders to 
implement sustainable development. Counting only partnerships, the database 
included over 340 partnerships at its peak, however, today that number is down to 
196.1 Much of what we know today about partnerships comes from studying the 
partnerships in the CSD’s registry. Partnerships have remained a cornerstone of the 
global governance of sustainability. In 2012 at the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20), world leaders again emphasized the central role of 
partnerships for implementing sustainable development in the outcome document 
“The Future We Want”, even if some argue that the public-private interactions were 
given less attention then they deserved (Abbott 2012). The terminology changed 
however and the focus is now on a “new bottom-up approach” where stakeholders can 
register their voluntary commitments to a database managed by the Rio+20 
Secretariat. To date, roughly 750 commitments have been registered. Rio+20 also 
introduced the concept of Sustainable Development Action Networks, defined as 
“action-oriented communities where stakeholders may collaborate and share 
information on certain sustainable development topics” (UN 2014b). Here, 
stakeholders are encouraged to register their initiative in support of one of 7 action 
networks listed on the UN’s homepage (e.g. SE4ALL, Global Compact or Sustainable 
Cities). The trend towards bottom-up initiatives such as partnerships is also present in 
other issue areas such as climate change and health. Under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example, there is currently 
much discussion on how to integrate International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs), also 
called “climate clubs”, into the formal regime (Widerberg and Stenson 2013). Several 
studies have identified more than 75 different transnational initiatives, of which many 
are multi-stakeholder partnerships (e.g. Abbott 2011; Hale and Roger 2014; Bulkeley 
et al. 2012). Also in the context of health and aid effectiveness partnerships are 
increasingly being understood as important for global governance (Eyben and Savage 
2013; Voillat 2012). 
2.3 Key findings on the past performance of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships 
Evaluating the performance of partnerships is inherently difficult. Comparative studies 
are hampered by large differences in function, goals, capacity, and membership 
constellations. Many multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development have 
vague and diffuse goals and lack appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanisms, 
making the causality between the output of the partnership and impact on the ground 
difficult to establish. Notwithstanding the methodological challenges, much of the 
research on partnerships focuses on two central criteria for evaluation, namely 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The next sections briefly discuss the central tenets and 
results of research on effectiveness and legitimacy of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
for sustainable development. 
                                                          
1  http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1500 
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2.3.1 Effectiveness 
Improving the performance of multilateral, state-based sustainable development – in 
particular with regards to implementation – is a core argument for advancing 
partnerships as a governance tool above other mechanisms. Assessing the degree of 
effectiveness, however, poses three challenges. 
First, at what level of aggregation should the effectiveness of partnerships be 
evaluated? While a number of studies focus on the overall aggregate effectiveness of 
partnerships as a form of governance, i.e. the overall multi-stakeholder partnerships 
regime, (Pattberg et al. 2012), others scrutinize effectiveness at the level of individual 
partnerships (Liese and Beisheim 2011) or even at the concrete project implementation 
level (Beisheim and Liese 2014; Kasonde and Campbell 2012). 
Second, by which indicator should effectiveness be measured? Social scientists often 
distinguish between indicators at three distinct analytical levels: output, outcome and 
impact (Miles et al. 2001). Output measures the formal outputs of a partnership such 
as agreements, norms or guidelines; Outcome refers to the observable change in 
behaviour of targeted actors following the output; finally, impact is the observed 
change in the state of the problem itself (Miles et al. 2001; Easton 1965). While 
measuring the impact level often is the most attractive, it generally turns out to be 
extremely difficult to establish causal pathways between the actions of the 
partnership, behavioural change and changes in the target indicator. Consequently, 
output and outcome levels are most commonly used in partnership research. 
Third, against which yardstick should effectiveness be measured? As Schäferhoff, 
Campe and Kaan (2009, 457) point out, comparing partnerships in terms of 
effectiveness is difficult due to the broad range of functions that partnerships perform. 
One solution to this problem is introduced by Beisheim and Liese (2014), who focus 
exclusively on the goals set by the partnerships themselves. An obvious problem here 
is that unambitious or vague targets can make the partnership look highly effective 
while it barely contributes to solving the problem at hand. Another way is to measure 
degree of effectiveness according to a counter-factual scenario where the effects of a 
partnership are compared to a status quo ante or other politically feasible scenarios 
(Hale and Held 2011). 
Researchers have spent much time and effort assessing the merits of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. In 2012, the results of a six-year study were published in the book 
Public-private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence, Influence and 
Legitimacy (Pattberg et al. 2012). It analysed the WSSD Type II Partnerships in detail 
and constructed a Global Sustainability Partnership Database containing over 340 
partnerships to support the research. In 2014, another six-year project documented in 
the book Transnational Partnerships: Effectively providing for Sustainable 
Development reported its results on 21 transnational partnerships by in-depth case 
studies (Beisheim and Liese 2014). Moreover, a large number of workshops, 
colloquiums and smaller projects have contributed to the knowledge-base, for example 
Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development (Glasbergen, Biermann, and 
Mol 2007), Enhancing the Effectiveness of Sustainability Partnerships (Vollmer 2009), 
including a great number of scientific articles (see e.g. Andonova and Levy 2003; 
Andonova 2010; Pattberg 2010; Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Zammit 2003; Bäckstrand et 
al. 2012; Börzel and Risse 2005; Bitzer, Francken, and Glasbergen 2008). 
Consequently, there is a broad literature on transnational multi-stakeholder 
partnerships to draw upon. 
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The overall picture that emerges is rather sobering. Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
have, by and large, not lived up to their promise. There are certainly some that 
perform excellently and have had impressive impacts on their issue areas but these 
should be considered as anomalies. For example, health related partnerships (such as 
the GAVI Alliance that attempts to enhance the dissemination of immunization or the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) as well as standard-setting 
partnerships such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have been highly effective in 
realizing their goals and enticing behavioural change (Beisheim and Liese 2014; 
Pattberg 2005). On the other hand, a recent analysis of more than 340 Type II 
Partnerships shows a disappointingly low level of effectiveness (Pattberg et al. 2012; 
Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). 
Four main conclusions can be drawn.  
1. A number of partnerships are simply not active while approximately 40 percent 
have no measurable output. Of those partnerships that are active and show signs 
of output, only 60 percent match their output (such as research, capacity building, 
training or building infrastructure) with their self-reported function (e.g. service-
provision, knowledge transfer or standard-setting). This means that 40 percent of 
the active partnerships show activities that are not directly related to their publicly 
stated goals and ambitions (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 Partnership output related to publicly stated goals and ambitions  
2. At an aggregate level, partnerships do not seem to address core functions where 
their particular role and comparative advantage was expected to lie: to initiate new 
global governance norms in areas where governments fail to take action; to help 
implement existing intergovernmental regulations; and to increase the 
inclusiveness and participation in global governance by bringing in actors that 
have so far been marginalized. To illustrate the latter point, Figure 2.1 shows the 
number of partners from a specific sector in the total partnership sample (Pattberg 
et al. 2012, 252-253). The marginalization of key stakeholders (in particular the 
UN major groups) is evident. In addition, as Figure 2.2 indicates, a majority of 
partnerships are led by international organisations and state agencies while 
business actors are less prominent. This finding contradicts assumptions that the 
partnership approach can easily be subsumed under a “privatisation of 
governance” framing. These findings rather point to the insufficiently broad nature 
of multi-stakeholder partnerships. 
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Source: Pattberg et al. 2012 
Figure 2.2 Number of partners from different sectors 
 
Figure 2.3 Number of partnerships led by partners from a specific sector (source: 
Pattberg et al. 2012) 
3. At the level of individual partnerships, the lack of organisational capacity, 
resources and transparency becomes evident. Only around 15 percent (of the total 
sample of 340) indicate a budget plan, 23 percent report on office space, only 30 
percent have dedicated and identifiable staff members and just about 5 percent of 
all partnerships have an openly available memorandum of understanding (that 
would outline the precise roles and responsibilities of partners) (Pattberg et al. 
2012, 257-258). 
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4. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have also been reported to provide a highly visible 
platform for controversial technologies to gain recognition at the UN level, due to 
the lack of a strict screening and follow-up process. These technologies and 
practices introduced by partnerships for sustainable development include nuclear 
energy, biotechnologies, biofuels, PVC and vinyl, to name a few. As Mert and Chan 
(2012, 40) conclude: ”partnerships are not just neutral instruments for 
implementing internationally accepted sustainability norms, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals and Agenda 21, but rather sites of contestation 
over distinct technologies and practices”. 
In addition to these findings on WSSD Type II Partnerships, more recent discussions on 
partnerships in the issue area of climate change also highlight a number of challenges 
in the increasingly dense governance architecture, such as double-counting of impacts 
from different initiatives, redundancy in functions and overlap in membership (e.g. in 
partnerships on clean energy), political manoeuvring to avoid legally binding 
agreements, and powerful players shopping around for forums that best fit their 
interest (Widerberg and Stenson 2013). 
Finally, an important discussion relevant for the building blocks discussed later in this 
report relates to explaining the variation in effectiveness of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. First, a key observation is that design matters (Beisheim and Liese 2014; 
Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). Studying 21 transnational partnerships, Beisheim 
and Liese find that “level of institutionalisation” and “process” are the best predictors 
for level of effectiveness (2014). “Level of institutionalisation” is measured across three 
criteria: obligation, delegation and precision (Abbott et al. 2000). Obligation means to 
what level the actors are bound to by their commitment, e.g. binding laws or voluntary 
pledges; Precision means to what extent the rules of the partnership are clear and 
unambiguous; and, Delegation indicate to what extent third party actors have been 
given the authority to implement or, in particular, monitor or enforce the goals and 
decisions taken by the stakeholders in the partnership. Table 2.2 below outlines how 
Beisheim and Liese operationalize the different levels of institutionalisation. 
Table 2.2 Levels of institutionalisation* 
 Obligation Precision of norms Delegation 
High 
Binding rules Determinate rules: narrow 
room for interpretation 
External monitoring, 
centralized enforcement 
Medium 
Contingent obligations 
and escape clauses 
Areas of discretion and issues 
of interpretation 
Internal or external 
monitoring and publicity 
Low 
Rules not binding Broad rules, impossible to 
determine compliance 
No or confidential 
monitoring 
* Adapted from Beisheim and Liese (2011, 127) 
The main conclusion from this line of research is that a high level of institutional-
isation appears to lead to high level of effectiveness. Furthermore, Beisheim and Liese 
also find that process management, i.e. how professional and efficient the manage-
ment of the partnership is, can explain variation in the effectiveness of a partnership. 
2.3.2 Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of partnerships – i.e. the acceptance of a norm shared by a community 
– has been a matter of much discussion in the partnership debate (Bäckstrand 2006). 
And rightly so, since the promise of partnerships is a win-win situation where effective-
ness and the democratic credentials of global governance both increase (Bäckstrand et 
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al. 2012). However, arriving at a tangible and common understanding of the relation-
ship between partnerships and legitimacy has been difficult. There also is a lack of 
systematic and comparative studies on legitimacy that incorporate and compare 
different partnership types (service providing, knowledge-transfer or standard-setting) 
and issues areas (e.g. health, environment, security) (Pattberg et al. 2012, 167). 
We can identify four themes in the literature: (i) metrics; (ii) inclusiveness; (iii) 
accountability; and (iv) legitimacy vs. effectiveness. First, scholars argue about which 
yardstick should be used to measures level of legitimacy (Bäckstrand 2012). Keohane, 
for example, suggests that while we can use concepts of legitimacy from liberal 
democracy such as accountability, inclusiveness and transparency, the threshold for 
when a transnational partnership is legitimate needs to be lower than in a domestic 
setting due to a lack of one global demos (Keohane 2011). Otherwise, no partnership 
would be legitimate. 
Secondly, multi-stakeholder partnerships hold the promise of being more inclusive 
than other governance instruments as they, theoretically, involve all segments of 
society. Critical writers dispute this positive reading of partnerships and argue that the 
rollback of public authority and the increasing role of companies is merely a sign of 
more power going to private interests rather than to society as a whole (Miraftab 
2004). However, the verdict has been quite harsh on partnerships to date and data 
shows how countries from the northern hemisphere, along with large international 
organisations, are overrepresented, whereas poorer southern countries, CSOs and 
private stakeholders are underrepresented (Bäckstrand 2012; Pattberg 2010; Hale and 
Mauzerall 2004). 
Thirdly, multi-stakeholder partnerships have been discussed in terms of accountability. 
Bäckstrand argues (2006) that partnerships pose a problem due to their non-
hierarchical network structure. In a traditional state-driven multilateral agreement, 
states are to be held accountable for their actions by their citizens. In networked 
governance, authority and thus accountability is spread across the members of the 
network without any clear point of reference. Hale and Mauzerall also mention 
problems of accountability in the Type II Partnerships and highlight that several 
observers are sceptical to the motives behind partnership creation and fear that it will 
be mainly promises and few results (2004). A key deficit, the authors argue, is the lack 
of transparency in the Type II partnerships in terms of web-presence, monitoring and 
reporting systems (Hale and Mauzerall 2004). 
Finally, there is an ongoing discussion whether legitimacy is conducive for 
effectiveness. Intuitively, an inclusive attitude for new members in the partnership 
bolsters legitimacy. Also social constructivists argue that compliance and commitment 
increase when organisations internalize norms and engage in organisational and 
institutional learning (Checkel 2001). However, there is little evidence that 
inclusiveness is linked to effectiveness (Liese and Beisheim 2011). Legitimacy has also 
been found to be a compliance booster in standard-setting partnerships (Beisheim and 
Liese 2014). 
In conclusion, while multi-stakeholder partnerships should not be compared to state-
based forms of legitimacy, research has questioned the claim that partnerships 
automatically improve participation and accountability in global governance. However, 
research has also shown that legitimacy has positive effects on the performance of 
partnerships and therefore should be carefully monitored and managed. 
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3 Building blocks for successful multi-stakeholder 
partnerships 
Given the empirical findings on the limited success of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
for sustainable development to date, what can be done to improve their future 
performance? Sustainable development issues generally “pit business values for 
progress, profit and self-interested consumption of the environment against 
environmental values that stress ecological sustainability, interdependence with the 
natural works and opposition to exploitation” (Gray 2007, 30). For partnerships, the 
overarching challenge is therefore to bridge these conflicting values and agendas by 
creating a group that can establish trust, devise rules and procedures, and work 
together towards supplying a common good. More concretely, we differentiate 
between process-related (internal) and context-related (external) challenges to building 
a successful partnership. 
Internal challenges are connected to a partnership’s members and their interactions. 
For instance, Gray observes three main obstacles for collaboration in partnerships: 
past history, mistrust and identity issues; different framing of issues; and, process 
issues and institutional constraints (Gray 2007). First, actors might have a history of 
working against each other and collaboration could be infested by mistrust and fear of 
angering each organisation’s constituency. Second, actors frame things differently with 
often diverging problem-definitions and consequently come to different solutions. 
Third, partnerships often suffer from lack of organisational capacity and experience in 
managing collaborations and leading the process forward. Witte, Brenner and Streck 
echo these arguments and posit that trust, transparency and dealing with power-
asymmetries are key to success in a partnership (2003, 72). 
External challenges arise since partnerships are embedded in both international and 
national contexts. Beisheim and Liese for example, have shown how the external 
context of limited statehood matters for the question of how to design a partnership 
(2014). Visseren-Hamakers and colleagues argue that partnership performance is 
dependent on the “situational context” of existing rules within a country and at the 
international level (2007). Consequently, a partnership always should consider and 
orientate itself in, what we call, a governance architecture of already existing 
international, transnational and national institutional and legal frameworks. While 
internal and external challenges exist, there are proven methods to deal with those 
challenges. The coming sections address these design features and provide practical 
advice based on the available scientific consensus to date. 
3.1 Designing a successful partnership 
Building on the knowledge described in the previous sections, we have identified nine 
key aspects – divided into three categories Actors, Process and Context – that 
influence the outcome of a multi-stakeholder partnership. We call these the “nine 
building blocks for successful transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships” (see Figure 
3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Nine building blocks for successful partnerships 
The coming sections elaborate on each of the aspects and distil practical advice on 
what can be done to increase the likelihood of success under each building block. 
3.1.1 Actors 
Leadership 
Proactive and good leadership is essential for a partnership to succeed, both from 
individuals and from organisations. Throughout its lifetime, different types of 
leadership are needed. Young for example, differentiates between structural, 
entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership (Young 1991). Structural leadership is 
exercised when an actor can translate its material resources into power by, for 
example, provide side-payments, entrepreneurial leaders use their negotiation and 
framing skills to reach results and, finally, intellectual leadership provide the 
intellectual capital and background in a process (Young 1991). 
At the start of a partnership, a central role is that of the entrepreneur or broker 
(Glasbergen 2010), also called the “convener” (Gray 2007) or “orchestrator” (Abbott 
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and Snidal 2010). In transnational politics, these are often CSOs or international 
organisations, for example the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) that is 
highly active in forming multi-stakeholder partnerships (Hale and Roger 2014). 
Consequently, “convening power” is an important asset in this early phase of 
partnership building. 
While we recognize that good leadership is a red thread through the literature that 
describes successful partnerships, it remains a vague concept. Most observers simply 
note that leadership is essential yet provide little information on the conditions for 
effective leadership and means to foster it. Nevertheless, the following 
recommendations can be made: 
• Identify and manage the different types of leadership needed for the partnership to 
succeed. 
Partners 
The combined willingness, capability and resources of partners, i.e. the organisations 
and individuals that governs the partnership, who also often are the founders 
(Beisheim 2012), to fulfil the goals of the partnership are crucial to success. In 
particular the level of engagement from the most powerful and influential members is 
important (Newell, Pattberg, and Schroeder 2012). 
Partnerships are, in theory, networks of resource exchange, meaning that balancing 
powers and finding a working mix of resources, knowledge and capabilities is 
necessary to exploit synergies and enable a fruitful division of labour. 
Moreover, inclusiveness and involving the “right” partners requires attention. There are 
several cases where omitting powerful and important stakeholder (relative to the issue 
area) have led to the end of a partnership or a sub-optimal performance (Wigell 2008; 
Gray 2007, 36). Two examples of omission of partners or insufficient “anchoring” are 
noteworthy. First, when the World Health Assembly (WHA) decided on the 
establishment of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988, some countries 
were unaware of what they committed to due to poor and unclear communication. This 
led to further discussions once the partnership was operational and may have 
hampered the speed of implementation, illustrating how anchoring of decisions should 
be carried out among all relevant partners and stakeholders to avoid problems further 
down the line (Aylward et al. 2003). Second, the effectiveness of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is based on the ability of the national multi-
stakeholder group to actively engage with their government in sharing information 
about resource-related payments. Capacity and willingness of public actors to support 
the EITI process are important obstacles here. Moreover the effectiveness of EITI is also 
limited by varying levels of support from civil society. On the one hand, EITI is a multi-
stakeholder initiative that gives CSO’s voice and influence. On the other hand, many 
international campaigning CSO’s think of the EITI as a second-best solution and lobby 
for a hard-law approach to the problem (for more information on GPEI and EITI see 
Annex 1). Consequently, inclusion of and clear communication to the most relevant 
partners for solving the problem at hand is essential. However, several case-studies 
show how anchoring decisions and establishing contacts with the target groups also 
are necessary to enable change. 
Another key challenge is power-asymmetries between members in the partnership. For 
example, Visseren-Hamakers and colleagues show that in national-level partnerships in 
some Southern countries, governments and industry have much experience of working 
closely together, however less so with civil society groups. If civil society was included 
in decision-making it was rather through consultation than as an equal partner (2007). 
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Hence, in these cases, capacity building for civil society groups should be considered. 
Moreover, partnerships including transnational corporations (TNCs) often suffer from 
power-asymmetry in terms of sheer financial and human resources and information. 
This can be detrimental to trust among members and should be addressed. 
A central tool for addressing power-asymmetries is transparency. Engaging and 
ensuring open and transparent communication, decision-making procedures and 
evaluations increases the likelihood of having weaker parties participate and access 
the outcomes of the partnership, in particular since the results are likely to mirror the 
power-balance among the partners. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Conduct a detailed and thorough needs assessment (what partners would be 
needed to induce change?). Key criteria should be capacity, willingness and 
interests in attending. 
• Map the prevalent values and identities of potential partners, and try to devise 
counter-arguments, common points of interest, and where bargaining could be 
successful and not successful. 
• Ensure and promote open and transparent communication, decision-making and 
evaluation. 
3.1.2 Process 
Goal-setting 
High ambition levels and precise targets are conducive to successful partnerships. 
Setting a clear and measurable goal has at least three benefits. First, it provides 
certainty for both members in the group and external stakeholders to adjust behaviour 
and policy. It facilitates monitoring, reporting and evaluation, which increases the 
possibility to correct problems. It also increases the possibility to hold a partnership 
accountable and thus is expected to have a positive effect on legitimacy.  
Beisheim and Liese show that the effectiveness of a partnerships depends on the 
“precision of norms” (2011). High level of precision in rules and norms means that 
there is only limited room for interpretation. Lower degrees of precision open up space 
for discretion and interpretation, or even render the rules so vague and broad that they 
impede compliance, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation, and consequently limit 
accountability and transparency. Consider for example the difference in the target 
between GPEI and CCAC: “eradicate all polio cases by 2000” (GPEI’s initial target), and 
“raising awareness of short-lived climate pollutant impact and mitigation strategies”, 
(CCAC’s first objective). Precise rules and goals also have a stabilizing and reassuring 
effect on governments and firms to invest resources when trying to achieve the goals 
of the partnership (Keohane and Victor 2011). Precision and stringency is particularly 
important for standard-setting partnerships (Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2013). 
Ambitious and precise goals should be developed already in the start-up phase, which 
offers the opportunity to develop a common vision among the partners. During the 
lifetime of a partnership, ambitions and goals should periodically be reviewed in order 
to adapt them to changing circumstances. Visseren-Hamakers and colleagues argue 
that performance is likely to increase if the members of a partnership share a basic 
consensus on the strategies used to reach sustainable development, on development 
cooperation and on partnerships as a governance mechanism (2007, 163). Since multi-
stakeholder partnerships engage stakeholders with different frames, identities, 
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constituencies and goals, there needs to be a common understanding on key drivers of 
the problem and a vision on how to address them. Especially non-state actors with a 
more inclusive perspective on sustainable development (or those actors that focus on 
output effectiveness) tend shy away from ineffective partnerships (Visseren-Hamakers, 
Arts, and Glasbergen 2007). As a consequence, the lack of precise and ambitious goals 
in current partnerships could be an explanation for why civil society actors often are 
under-represented. Moreover, partnerships could be conducive to change frames and 
prioritizations. GPEI, for example, fostered international dialogue between national 
health officers and actors on polio which socialized governments into increasing their 
attention to combatting the disease and join the partnership (Koenig-Archibugi 2011). 
Finally, to foster coherence in the international system and create to support 
international and transnational sustainable development, goals should be aligned with 
international norms already in place. When studying the successes of the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative, Aylward and colleagues, argue that an endorsement of the policy 
goals from a high-level forum – in GPEI’s case the World Health Assembly – enables 
broad debates and buy-in in once the partnership is scaled up (2003). For polio 
eradication, the large discussions arose from whether the partnership’s activities 
weakened national capacities to deal with other diseases or inflicted opportunity costs 
of strengthening the national health system overall (Aylward et al. 2003). A high-level 
endorsement ensured the continuation of the partnership. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Understand the importance of developing a common vision and goals from the very 
outset. 
• Work towards a common problem-definition. 
• Aim for the clear and measurable goals. 
• Map the compatibility of partnership goals with other related goals (e.g. SDGs, CSR, 
human rights) and work towards aligning them. 
Funding 
Adequate funding and resources are cornerstones for a stable and successful 
partnership. Some have argued that the emergence of partnerships could lead to more 
unstable streams of funding as financing is increasingly provided through voluntary 
and “ultimately unpredictable” good-will from private financiers (Martens 2007, 5). 
However, there is little evidence that governments are more likely to sustain a constant 
stream of funding than private funders such as foundations, and it is plausible to think 
that funding shortages can be actively managed by the partnership’s management. 
Governments are by no means the only source of income for partnerships while private 
initiatives and foundations are becoming wealthier and perhaps increasingly important 
for providing common goods. Sourcing funds is thus an increasingly important task for 
partnership managers and it is wise to have a clear and effective strategy for attracting 
funding in a professional way. For example, Aylward and colleagues note that in the 
case of GPEI, soliciting professional lobby firms to target political decision-makers and 
international forums have contributed to securing sufficient funding from donor 
governments (2003). 
There is no template for what funding-model works best. Successful organisations 
have employed a number of approaches, for example, limiting donations coming from 
one source, relying on membership fees or funding from the partnership members, 
and funnelling money generated from partnership activities back to the organisations, 
for example in the case of standard-setting (Reinicke et al. 2000). GAVI is often 
mentioned as a particularly good example for innovative financing where they have 
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created two funding streams by issuing bonds and creating a fund to promise 
pharmaceutical companies with a set price given that they would develop a certain 
type of drug (see case study in Annex 1). Also for the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the funding structure appears to have contributed to its 
successful implementation. 45 percent of EITI’s funding comes from supporting 
countries and 55 percent from supporting companies. All costs for validation of EITI 
compliance are born by countries being validated (see Annex 1). 
Moreover, it is plausible to assume that those partnerships that can show-case their 
actions and prove their effectiveness are more likely to attract funding. To stand out in 
the competition, funding is thus deeply intertwined with goal setting, monitoring, 
reporting and evaluation. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Establish well-organized resources and finance management units for securing and 
managing funds. 
• Hire a fund-raising manager and/or train management staff in fund-raising. 
• Consider fund-raising purposes in communications with external stakeholders and 
when reporting on the progress on the partnership. 
• Set realistic goals and implementing procedures that are plausible to reach and 
easy to communicate to possible funders. 
Management 
There is a clear correlation between the effectiveness of a partnership and its process 
management (Liese and Beisheim 2011). While it is hardly surprising that effective and 
efficient internal organisation is conducive for the organisational goals to be met, in 
many cases, inadequate resources, time and thinking is spent on the managerial 
aspects of a partnership. While the verdict is still out on what governance structure a 
partnership should have to optimize effectiveness, some studies indicate that a small 
governing board of major donors, supported by a secretariat and room for input by a 
select group of affected stakeholders, is favourable for a lean and effective process 
management and decision-making (Liese and Beisheim 2011). Common strategic 
plans, clear division of roles and responsibilities and multi-level forums to coordinate 
funding and resources have been identified as effective management structures 
(Aylward et al. 2003). Also smart management measures taken on a local level are 
found to facilitate success. Aylward and colleagues, for example, have argued that 
efficient management is key to the success of the GPEI by for instance providing clear 
and well-defined demands on the community and boosting local capacity to administer 
vaccinations (2003). Similarly for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
a functioning multi-stakeholder structure with clear roles and responsibilities clearly 
contributed to the broad acceptance and visibility in global debates about resource-
based corruption and transparency. Particularly important is the leadership and 
strategic vision of the EITI board as well as transparent and legitimate procedures for 
selecting representatives of all stakeholders (see Annex 1). 
A reoccurring observation is that having full-time staff employed to service the 
partnership is conducive to effectiveness (Szulecki, Pattberg, and Biermann 2011; 
Beisheim 2012). A high level of institutionalisation with formal organisation and 
bureaucracy is thus to prefer over a loosely coupled network structure with, for 
example, a hosted secretariat within an already existing organisation. For example, it 
has been shown that a partnership with a permanent and independent secretariat is 
more likely to be successful than a hosted partnership (Beisheim 2012). However, 
there needs to be a balance between level of institutionalisation and amount of red-
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tape. Partnerships should rely on existing institutions as far as possible and avoid 
becoming a new institution or agency by limiting their bureaucracy’s work only the 
essential coordination tasks (Reinicke et al. 2000). Szulecki and colleagues also find 
that organisational characteristics such as a strong ‘corporate identity’ appear to be 
correlated with effectiveness (2011). 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Engage full-time staff, focusing solely on partnership tasks. 
• Allow for staff with managerial experience to occupy key positions. 
• Provide the means for ensuring effective communication between the process 
managers and the partnership members, as well as between the partnership 
members. 
• Aim for continuous, transparent, and low-cost communication within the 
partnership. 
• Establish an open and transparent knowledge-exchange mechanism for everyone to 
share and take part of knowledge created by and relevant to the partnership. 
• Establish clear and transparent rules and roles for procedural issues including staff-
recruitment, fund-raising, and decision-making. 
• Create a clear, fair and transparent dispute resolution mechanism in case of 
conflicts (mediation and facilitation). 
• Minimize the amount of red-tape and bureaucracy needed to move things forward. 
• Identify key limitations in the capacity among the partnership members and take 
measures to mitigate the problems that arise from unequal levels of resources and 
capacity. 
Monitoring, reporting, evaluation and learning 
An adequate and efficient monitoring, reporting and evaluation system is important for 
several reasons. First, it enables organisational learning. Institutions have proven more 
effective when they are able to adapt quickly to new circumstances. To manage this 
process, monitoring progress, producing reports and evaluating outcomes are 
essential tools for understanding how the partnership is doing vis-à-vis its targets and 
goals. Second, both public and private constituencies are increasingly demanding to 
see the impacts their financial or in-kind contributions. In the case of the GPEI, for 
example, large institutional donors only agreed to join the initiative once the 
appropriate delivery mechanisms and impacts could be proven beyond anecdotal 
evidence (Aylward et al. 2003). Third and finally, monitoring, reporting and evaluation 
are needed to enhance transparency, which in turn is instrumental for process 
legitimacy (Wigell 2008; Bäckstrand 2012, 175).  
There are striking differences in the monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities of 
partnerships. The GPEI, for example, releases multi-year strategic plans that are 
published online and widely discussed among academia and other stakeholders. These 
are followed up by annual reports, which provide transparency and possibility for 
accountability by reporting on funding, achievements and trends (see Annex 1). 
Another example where monitoring and reporting clearly has been a supporting factor 
to success is REEEP, which has developed a monitoring mechanism that guarantees 
responsible and effective project spending. Projects need to submit quarterly reports, 
containing outputs, impacts as well as detailing the timings, risks approach and media 
activity for each project alongside a financial review. These are in turn reviewed and 
recommended by Regional Secretariats and sent to the International Secretariat, which 
makes a decision regarding acceptance of progress and payments. When a project is 
completed, a final report on the whole initiative and finances is submitted, often 
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prepared with the help of external experts and auditors. After a set period of time a 
general impact assessment is conducted to examine the value of the project and its 
contribution to the more general goals (climate change mitigation, MDGs, future 
replication and regional scaling-up) (See Annex 1). 
Whereas GPEI and REEEP publish extensive annual reports, strategy documents and 
third party evaluations online, CCAC has very sparse information available, at least in 
the public domain. A good example of learning from evaluation is the recent revision 
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard, a clear reaction to 
shortcomings noted in a recent third-party report (Reite et al. 2011). On this account, 
the EITI has proven to be flexible and adaptive in the context of a fast-changing policy-
setting. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Establish procedures for monitoring and evaluation including both internal 
(governance structure, financial administration, process management, and decision-
making) and external indicators (progress towards reaching the goals, as well as 
other output and deliverables).  
• Establish procedures to allow for change and adaptation based on monitoring and 
evaluation. 
• Develop a clear overview of the intervention logic of the partnership’s activities, set 
up milestones, and evaluation points. This is what is often referred to as “theory of 
change” or as Vollmer calls it, “impact pathways” and “results chains” (2009, 27). 
• Be transparent in communicating successes and draw-backs, strategies, reports and 
evaluations. 
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Outlook: The ladder of partnership activity 
To evaluate partnerships and guide behaviour, Glasbergen has proposed a Ladder of 
Partnership Activity representing an idealized model of the entire partnership process (2011). It 
is a heuristic tool to assess where challenges and opportunities arise as the partnership 
develops and changes due to internal and external influence. The ladder consists of five steps 
organized along an X-axis representing changes in the methodology of the partnership from T1 
to T2, and a Y-axis representing the internal and external dynamics of the partnership. The first 
step is exploratory and relates to trust building between the members of the partnership. The 
second is formation where a comparative advantage in problem-solving is created vis-à-vis other 
modes of governance and members formulate their own costs and benefits for collaborating. 
The third is rule and norm formation measured by the outputs of the partnership. The fourth is 
implementation and relates to the outcomes of the partnership. Finally, both the intended and 
unintended impacts of the partnerships are envisaged by “changing the political order”.  
 
As time goes, the partnership moves from a focus on the members of the partnerships and their 
interactions to external interactions with the target and issue area. While each step of the ladder 
can be analysed in their isolation, it is important to note that there is action and interaction 
along the way. The trust building carried out in the first step and the collaborative advantages 
developed in the second step, are likely to change along with the methodology used in the 
partnership which in turn changes the costs and benefits for each member to collaborate. It is 
therefore important to continuously engage in trust building and monitor and evaluate the 
progress of the partnership to make enable adaptation to new circumstances. 
Source:  Glasbergen, P. (2011) Understanding partnerships for sustainable development analytically: 
the ladder of partnership activity as a methodological tool. Environmental Policy and 
Governance, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pages 1-13. 
 
3.1.3 Context 
Meta-governance 
Partnerships are an indication of an emerging property of global governance, namely 
fragmentation, which is characterized by uncoordinated and non-hierarchical 
institutional arrangements, often leading to overlap and competition among initiatives 
within one and the same issue area. Without coordination, fragmentation could lead to 
inefficiencies, redundancies and a seemingly large governance landscape but with little 
real impact. To deal with fragmentation, we need to have a framework for meta-
governance, i.e. “the organisation of self-organisation” or “regulation of self-regulation” 
(Derkx and Glasbergen 2014). There are also normative arguments for increased 
scrutiny of partnerships as an instrument. As Martens claims: “If global partnerships 
are not to stand in the way of a democratic multilateralism, they need clearly to fulfil 
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
 30  Building blocks for successful multi-stakeholder partnerships 
    
 
criteria that ensure that the long-term interests of the public are not damaged by the 
particular partnership initiative.” (2007, 8). 
Moreover, meta-governance for partnerships was recently brought up in a special 
session at the UNGA on partnerships’ role in implementing the post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). One of the key conclusions echoed much of what research 
has previously shown, namely that “Partnerships need to be vetted ex ante against 
criteria to determine fitness for purpose in pursuit of the post-2015 goals. Such 
criteria should consider human rights record, capacity to deliver, acts of corruption, 
financial transparency and compliance with taxation, and other conflicts of interest 
antithetical to universal norms and principles.” (UN 2014c).The discussions also 
touched upon the need for an institutional home for this vetting process by arguing 
that: “A facility is needed to safeguard concerns and to examine the growing corporate 
influence over human development.” (UN 2014c). 
Witte, Streck and Brenner argue that three things should be accomplished to improve 
the workings of the Type II partnerships: first, ensure coherence between the 
processes and outcomes of the multilateral negotiations; second, establish ground-
rules for partnerships to foster accountability, capacity building and evaluation, and 
third, to put a mechanism for monitoring, evaluation and learning in place (2003). The 
Type II partnerships entirely lacked these types of procedures and the partnership unit 
at the Division for Sustainable Development (DSD) was never entrusted with 
appropriate screening, reviewing, or monitoring authority (Mert and Chan 2012). The 
so-called Bali Guidelines2 provided to assess the partnerships were too weak and never 
backed up with the appropriate resources at the DSD secretariat or stringency in terms 
of reporting requirements (Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014). 
Consequently, research on the meta-governance of partnerships for sustainable 
development highlights two important aspects. First, partnerships should be checked 
against a number of criteria to determine their conduciveness to, for example, the 
SDGs and other international policy goals. Second, there should be an institution in 
charge of the vetting process that holds more power than the DSD. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Partnerships should be checked against a number of minimum criteria for their 
conduciveness to the SDGs 
• Map the governance architecture in which the partnership is established 
• Explore opportunities, establish contact and build alliances with other partnerships, 
organisations and institutions working with related problems. 
Political and social context 
Most issue areas in contemporary world politics are already densely populated by 
governance arrangements. Together with international, national and local institutional 
frameworks, partnerships often add to a dense patchwork of existing institutions. 
Consequently, partnerships are embedded in a political and social context that will 
influence their chances to thrive. For example, Beisheim and Liese highlight the 
difficulty of operating in areas lacking the basic skeleton for governance such as rule-
of-law or anti-corruption policies (2014). Hence, the political and social context is 
identified as a major factor determining the outcome of a partnership and 
consequently has to be taken into consideration already in the start-up phase. 
                                                          
2  http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/dsd/dsd_aofw_par/par_critguid.shtml 
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The political and social context is particularly important at two levels. First, the 
political and social context is relevant at the level of the actual governance 
architecture, where partnerships are situated among other global, international and 
transnational institutional arrangements (e.g. multi-lateral environmental agreements 
and other partnerships). Building on Visseren-Hamakers and colleagues, we note that 
partnerships can have three functions vis-à-vis the wider governance architecture: if 
functions are filled that support multilateral regimes, they are complementary; if 
functions are filled that used to be carried out by governments, they erode public 
authority; and, if functions are fulfilled in a new manner, they reinvent politics 
(Visseren-Hamakers, Leroy, and Glasbergen 2012).  
Second, service-providing partnerships with local level implementation are dependent 
on local conditions. This can be used to the benefits of the partnership. Best practices 
from multi-stakeholder partnerships in developing countries show the importance of 
learning and building on local institutional and governance structures when delivering 
common goods. It has also been shown that institutional capacity building was 
needed, in particular in countries with a violent past (Stringer et al. 2014). In the case 
of GPEI, one analysis argue that partnerships should take the local health systems into 
account when setting targets and creating projects and preferably strengthening these 
systems (Aylward et al. 2003). On the other hand, including the right partners but also 
communicate with the target audience is important. In 2006, GPEI suddenly suffered 
from a large break in trust from the local communities in northern Nigeria who 
believed that the vaccine could make you sterile. Consequently, the entire program 
had to be put on hold for nearly 12 months and creating a new polio outbreak in 
places far beyond the affected region (Aylward and Tangermann 2011). Working with 
local traditional and religious leaders, the trust was regained and the activities of the 
partnership could continue. 
The following recommendations can be made: 
• Map the governance architecture in which the partnership is established. 
• Identify the “Achilles heals” of the strategies for implementation and develop 
contingency plans to deal with these situations. 
• When needed, engage in capacity building to create the necessary institutional 
conditions for implementation, taking into account local conditions. 
Problem-structure 
A final intervening variable that determines the likelihood of a successful partnership 
is the structure of the problem at hand. A range of researchers have argued that 
‘malign problems’ characterized by high levels of complexity, competing interests and 
unclear solutions are less likely to be solved than ‘benign problems’ where actors’ 
interests and preferences converge, and solutions are easier to identify (see e.g. Miles 
et al. 2001). It is thus important to control for problem structure when measuring the 
success of a partnership. In addition, when designing a partnership it is therefore 
important to recognize that every problem has distinct features with specific 
administrative problems and political constituencies and thus requires different 
institutional setups (Abbott 2012; Keohane and Victor 2011). 
Problem-structure may, however, be malleable. Scientific discovery might reduce 
uncertainties in what measures that would be appropriate and thereby assisting in 
building a business-case for addressing a policy issue. In the case of GEPI, for 
example, the increased certainty and demonstration that polio was both a threat to 
nations but eradicable, is likely to have been conducive to the successes of the 
partnership (Shiffman, Beer, and Wu 2002). 
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The following recommendations can be made: 
• Analyse problem structure to identify clear and measurable goals for the 
partnerships. 
3.2 Prioritising building blocks 
A clear lesson learned from years of research on public-private partnerships is that 
there is no “one-size fits all” solution to designing successful interventions. Besides 
practical boundary conditions such as financial and human resources, the envisaged 
function and membership constellation of the partnership influence what factors 
should be taken into consideration when designing a partnership. Witte, Streck and 
Brenner, for example, argue that an equal representation of stakeholders may be 
important when a partnership is intended to negotiate and set global standards and 
norms, but less important if it has coordinating function (Witte, Streck, and Benner 
2003, 66). Moreover, several authors highlight the observation that partnerships often 
transform over time and change functions, goals and membership constellations. 
Consequently, it is important not to design all partnerships according to a pre-set 
template, but rather to explore its envisaged functions and then determine what the 
most appropriate structure is. 
A key observation made in this study is that the degree of importance of each building 
blocks depends on the type of partnership (Liese and Beisheim 2011; Witte, Streck, 
and Benner 2003). This is highly useful knowledge when choosing where to allocate 
scarce resources in setting-up and running a partnership. Fortunately, research is able 
to facilitate the prioritization process of resources. The following overview provides a 
number of important recommendations for allocating resources in the process of 
partnership-building. 
Leadership is important for all types of partnership; however, different partnership-
types may require different types of leadership. While entrepreneurial leadership and 
convening power are important in the start-up phase across the board, intellectual 
leadership could prove more important in knowledge-transfer partnerships.  
Partner selection (procedures for selecting and including members) is particularly 
important for standard-setting and service provision and implementation partnerships. 
For service provision and implementation partnerships, which are often highly 
demanding in terms of human and financial resources, it is essential to find a good 
division of labour among partners to avoid overlaps. For standard-setting partnerships, 
success is based on uptake (and compliance) among their target group, which is 
enhanced by legitimacy (Liese and Beisheim 2011, 116). 
Goal setting (including the ambition level and precision and stringency of targets) is 
particularly important for service providing/implementation and standard-setting 
partnerships. A service providing partnership requires more financial and human 
resources, which in turn increases the incentives for free-riding behaviour among the 
partners since the potential gains are high (Beisheim and Liese 2014). Consequently, a 
high level of institutionalisation with precise rules is needed to mitigate the risk of 
free-riders and establish trust among the collaborating members. 
Funding is particularly important for service-provision and implementation 
partnerships. These are generally very costly endeavours compared to the other three 
types and require substantial financial and human resources to function well. It is 
therefore considered particularly important to invest time and thinking into finding 
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funding mechanisms that attract sufficient resources over time while being resistant to 
changes in the funding base. 
Management and monitoring, reporting, evaluation and learning are considered 
important success factors across the board. Any type of partnership is smart to 
allocate adequate resources to these building blocks. 
Meta-governance is most important where a partnership can benefit from 
coordination with other partnerships and initiatives. The largest synergies are found 
where the costs are the highest, hence in particular service-providing/implementation 
partnerships, with high operational costs could make use of engaging in meta-
governance initiatives. 
Problem structure is clearly something every partnership will have to consider; 
however, it appears to be less a determining building block for knowledge-transfer 
partnerships. 
Political and social context, i.e. the state of local and national capacities and 
conditions, existing laws and regulations or other institutional frameworks, is mainly 
relevant in situations where local implementation is involved (service-
providing/implementation partnerships). 
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4 Conclusion and recommendations 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships have become central implementation mechanisms for 
reaching global sustainable development goals. Their status has been (re)affirmed at 
every large multilateral conference on sustainable development over the past 25 years 
– from the Earth Summit in 1992, to the 2002 WSSD in 2002 and Rio+20, and multiple 
conferences on aid effectiveness. During the ongoing discussions on a post-2015 
development agenda, multi-stakeholder partnerships are as present as ever. Their 
prominence forces stakeholders from governments, CSOs and companies to consider 
their position vis-à-vis partnerships. A key challenge is to increase partnership 
effectiveness and legitimacy, which have been limited to date. There are however also 
examples of highly effective multi-stakeholder partnerships such as the large health 
initiatives GAVI and GPEI, which have had huge positive impacts on global 
immunization and eradication of common diseases or the EITI, which has enhanced 
national legislation on extractive industries practices. 
Based on over 15 years of research we have drawn lessons from both success failure 
cases for designing and implementing multi-stakeholder partnerships. Based on a 
literature-review and input from practitioners and experts, we have identified nine 
building blocks necessary for creating successful multi-stakeholder partnerships. We 
are thus confident that partnerships have the potential to be effective; however, all 
stakeholders should always carefully consider their approaches to pursue their 
interests in global politics. Since multi-stakeholder partnerships often are costly 
endeavours, both in terms of resources and opportunity costs, the building blocks 
could assist stakeholders with limited funds and staff (such as CSOs) by presenting a 
check-list of what to expect from their public and private partners prior to entering an 
agreement. 
The following guiding questions will assist stakeholders in their decision whether to 
engage in multi-stakeholder partnerships. 
Leadership 
• Is there sufficient leadership available which promises an inclusive and transparent 
process, fair and effective conflict-resolution, ability to consolidate divergent views 
and create trust among partners? 
Partners 
• Is the inclusion of partners based on a satisfactory analysis of who to involve? 
• Are the included partners genuinely committed to the goals and vision of the 
partners?  
• Are there key players that are excluded or even opposing the partnership? 
Goal setting 
• Is there sufficient time and effort given to generate a common vision, goal and 
commitment among the partners? 
• Are goals formulated in a specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timed way? 
• Do they lend themselves to third-party verification? 
• Are the goals supporting global norms on sustainable development? 
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Funding 
• Is there sufficient amount of seed-funding to kick-start the process? 
• Are there mechanisms in place to ensure a sustained flow of financial resources to 
reach the goals of the partnership? 
Management 
• Is there a professional and independent bureaucracy in place to handle the day-to-
day businesses? 
• Does the management structure enable a lean and efficient process with the 
capability to adapt to new challenges? 
Monitoring, reporting, evaluation and learning 
• Is there a regular, independent, and transparent monitoring and reporting 
framework envisaged that allows all stakeholders to have access to the same type 
of information and assess the progress and problems of the partnership? 
• Are regular, independent and transparent evaluation practices envisaged that allow 
stakeholders to assess levels of effectiveness and identify points for improvement? 
Meta-governance 
• Are the partnership’s goals and procedures in line with internationally agreed goals 
and norms (such as the MDG’s or SDG’s)? 
Social and political context 
• Are social and political contexts sufficiently taken into consideration in the design 
of implementing measures? 
• Are there contingency plans for how to deal with new challenges and unforeseen 
problems in implementation in different contexts? 
Problem structure 
• Does the problem lend itself to be addressed by a multi-stakeholder partnership 
and do the measures, goals and vision fit the challenges ahead? 
• Are the partners open for new framings of a problem and is there a common 
understanding of what the drivers and solutions are to reach the goals? 
 
Considering these guiding questions should increase the likelihood of setting-up a 
successful multi-stakeholder partnership. Moreover, depending on both the maturity 
and type of multi-stakeholder partnership, the nine building blocks can add even more 
specific guidance to stakeholders. First, from a chronological perspective, before 
starting a partnership, sufficient time and resources should be invested in formulating 
common goals, ambitions and visions, identifying and attracting the relevant partners, 
and setting-up mechanisms for dealing with dispute settlement among the partners. 
Once these preconditions have been met, the partners must ensure an effective 
management, allocate adequate resources for process management, and devise smart 
funding structures to ensure a sustained flow of resources. Monitoring, reporting and 
evaluation are key parts of the procedure to create internal and external legitimacy, 
show-case successful implementation and identify and learn from mistakes. 
Throughout the entire process, the partnership must adapt to a changing environment 
and social and political context. Leadership is a central element during the entire 
partnership process (to guide behaviour, create momentum, and consolidate diverging 
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interests). However, once the partnership has been launched and management 
practices are in place, it is rather an iterative than a linear process. 
Secondly, the findings of this report suggest that it is important to consider the 
envisaged function of a partnership. By and large, service providing partnerships, such 
as GAVI, GPEI, and REEEP, demand larger financial and human resources and more 
knowledge about political and social contexts than knowledge transfer and standard-
setting, since the former’s implementation on the ground is highly resource intensive. 
Finally, the global community needs to engage in proper meta-governance (i.e. 
institutional oversight) of multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. 
This is essential to improve the credibility and effectiveness of the entire UN approach 
to the SDGs. For instance, a main conclusion from the evaluation of the WSSD’s Type II 
Partnerships has been that the policy officers managing the registry created to monitor 
all the initiatives lacked the mandate, authority and criteria to ensure that only 
partnerships with a clear and substantial contribution to the MDGs were designated as 
“partnerships for sustainable development”. The result was a surprisingly large amount 
of “empty shells”, where an initiative was launched under much pomp and 
circumstances only to dissipate into oblivion a few years later. This is not only bad 
news for the effectiveness and overall performance of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
but also to the legitimacy and trust-worthiness of the UN brand. Therefore, meta-
governance is urgently needed to develop safe-guards that would avoid repeating the 
mistakes made with the Type II partnerships. One approach would be to further 
develop the nine building blocks into minimum criteria for being considered as a 
partnership for sustainable development, for instance, a clear and measurable 
contribution to the future SDGs. 
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Annex A Case study factsheets 
Here we present five case-studies in standardized factsheets that have been used as 
examples throughout this study. 
 
1. GAVI Alliance (GAVI) 
2. Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI)  
3. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
4. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) 
5. Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) 
6. German Food Partnership (GFP) 
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GAVI 
No. 1 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) 
Homepage http://www.gavialliance.org/ 
Year established 2000 
Headquarter Geneva, Switzerland and Washington DC., USA 
Function Service provision/Implementation 
Funding GAVI’s two funding streams, innovative finance and direct contributions 
account for 37% and 63% respectively of the Alliance’s overall funding 
portfolio. The main direct funders are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and governments such as the UK. 
Reporting GAVI has an impressive transparency and reporting flow. Annual financial 
reports, openly accessible via http://www.gavialliance.org/funding/financial-
reports/, several other reports on for example themes and progress are readily 
available online. It also has a set of key performance indicators, some with 
quantified targets, available for display online. 
Founding partners Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Programme for Appropriate 
Technology in Health (PATH), the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), The World Bank, the US Agency for 
International Development, World Health Organisation (WHO), and the United 
Nations Children’s fund (UNICEF).  
Background The GAVI Alliance was launched as a public-private partnership at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in 2000 by a number of key players in the field of 
global health. For the first 6 years it worked on vaccine provision and 
development and support country-level immunization programmes. Since 
2006, it also works with Health System Strengthening (HSS) (Harmer and 
Bruen 2011). GAVI is the successor of the other vaccine oriented partnerships 
such as the Children’s Vaccine Initiative. It is today active in over 70 countries 
worldwide. 
Results GAVI is considered highly effective (Beisheim and Liese 2014). Between 2000 
and 2008, US $ 2 billion delivered to countries for vaccines, immunization 
programs and health system strengthening (HSS), 51 million children 
vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, protect 213 million 
children with new and underused vaccines 192 million children against 
Hepatitis B 42 million against Haemophilisinfluenza type b and 36 million 
children against yellow fever (Harmer and Bruen 2011). Since the GAVI alliance 
was launched, global immunization coverage went up from 73 % in 2000 to 83 
% in 2012 (GAVI 2014). 
 
GAVI has been particularly successful in attracting funding from both public 
and private donors. In total, the partnership received almost US $10 billion 
and in 2013 alone, 1.7 billion were received, with the lion’s part coming from 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the United Kingdom.3 
                                                          
3  Financial results can be downloaded from the GAVI website: 
http://www.gavialliance.org/funding/donor-contributions-pledges/ 
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Analysis Four factors appear to explain GAVI’s success: the institutional design; the high 
level of trust and commitment; the innovative funding mechanisms; and 
process management. 
 
Schäferhoff links GAVI’s success with its institutional design and high level of 
precision, obligation and delegation (2014). Beisheim and colleagues attribute 
much of the design (and thus implicitly success) of GAVI to the instrumental 
and entrepreneurial leadership of the Bill and Melina Gates Foundation 
(Beisheim, Liese, and Vosseler 2014). They argue that the Foundation could 
absorb the large transactional costs often associated with starting up a 
partnership. However, Buse and Tanaka argue that a shared sense of purpose, 
trust and commitment rather than clearly defined structure was the key to 
GAVI’s success (2011). 
 
Harmer and Bruen (2011) attribute much of GAVI’s success to its unique 
feature of having various funding mechanisms. GAVI has four funding sources 
including direct funding, Matching Funding, the International Finance Facility 
for Immunization (IFFIm) and Advanced Market Commitments (AMC). The 
latter two are fairly unique mechanisms where the administrative apparatus 
and treasury functions of the IFFIm are delegated to the World Bank. Financial 
stability is sought by issuing bonds on the capital markets together with 
backing of long-term government pledges (Harmer and Bruen 2011). The AMC 
sets a guaranteed prize on vaccines for manufacturers once the product is on 
the market, under the condition that is lives up to a number of strict criteria. 
Disbursement of funds to recipient countries is made through performance-
based system and incentives are in place to reward higher immunization rates 
(Harmer and Bruen 2011).  
 
GAVI’s process management is also considered a contributing factor to its 
success. Initially hosted by UNICEF, later separated offices in Geneva and 
Washington DC. It maintains a small and lean corporate-inspired structure and 
relies on local partners and agencies in recipient countries to develop and 
implement projects (Harmer and Bruen 2011).  
 
Problems with institutional fragmentation such as overlaps and duplication of 
processes, unsynchronized reporting, monitoring, review mechanisms, and 
strategies have increase the transaction costs for the entire governance 
architecture and GAVI has together with the World Bank and the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria started work on a Joint Funding 
Platform for Health System Strengthening. This was later transformed into the 
Health Systems Funding Platform.  
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GPEI 
 
No. 2 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) 
Homepage http://www.polioeradication.org/ 
Year established 1988 
Headquarter WHO & UNICEF HQs, regional and country offices. 
Function Service provision/Implementation 
Funding Since the start of the partnership, Rotary International, a private foundation, 
has given more than US$ 600 million by end of 2005, and contributed to much 
of the fundraising from governments (Aylward et al. 2003). Overall, over US$ 
10 billion has been given by international donors (GPEI 2014). For the coming 
budget periods, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations have also made 
considerable pledges overtaking the lead position from Rotary International. 
Reporting GPEI publishes multi-annual Strategic Plans, accompanied by a document 
outlining the Financial Resource Requirements (FRRs), and are openly 
available and complemented with Annual Reports that provide transparency 
and opportunity for accountability. The Annual Reports are available in English 
and French and an executive summary in the other four UN languages. 
Founding partners The partnerships has been led by the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
Rotary International, the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). It also engages a 
number of other public and private partners, as well as, national 
governments. 
Background GPEI has been described as the single largest internationally coordinated 
health project to date (Duintjer Tebbens et al. 2010). Following a series of 
events during the 1980s, including fund-raising campaigns by Rotary 
International and ground-breaking work by the Pan American Health 
Organisation (PAHO), GPEI was formed after a resolution by the 41st World 
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1988 committing to eradicate poliomyelitis (polio) 
globally by the year 2000 (Shiffman, Beer, and Wu 2002). The partnership’s 
creation was the result of a global agreement across low, middle and high 
income countries and partly inspired by the successes of an international 
campaign to eradicate smallpox which ended in 1977 (Aylward et al. 2003). 
Results GPEI has enjoyed a tremendous success in reaching it goals. In 1999, type 2 
wild polioviruses has been effectively eradicated and fewer than 2000 annual 
paralytic poliomyelitis cases of wild types 1 and 3 has since then been 
reported (Duintjer Tebbens et al. 2010). In 1988, over 125 countries, mainly 
low-income, had reports of polio. By 2002, this number had decreased to 7 
countries (Aylward et al. 2003). After some changes in strategy, recent years 
have also brought down numbers of reported cases substantially in the 
countries with large pockets of polio infections, notably India and Nigeria 
(Aylward and Tangermann 2011). In 2013-14, polio cases have been reported 
in 10 countries including Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria, however, only in 
Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan is the virus endemic 
(www.polioeradication.org). 
By 2000, all countries part of the WHA had adopted versions of the WHO-
recommended polio eradication strategies and reported cases had dropped 
with 99 % from 1988 levels (Aylward and Tangermann 2011). In low-income 
countries there were huge efforts made to reach a sufficiently high amount of 
children (Aylward et al. 2003). In India for example, National Immunisation 
Days (NID) led to the immunization of 150 million children, which was 
repeated a month later and then annually for more than 5 years.  
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Analysis The successful creation of GPEI has been explained by Shiffman, Beer and Wu 
as the result of three forces, a widespread acceptance of polio as a threat, a 
perception that we were able to eradicate the disease and formations of 
supporting transnational health actors such as international organisations to 
fight the disease (2002). Koenig-Archibugi makes an interesting argument 
saying that the success of GPEI is not only the result of the convergence of 
states’ interests, but also due to the partnership’s ability to reshape the 
preferences of states by engaging national health officials and actors in 
international dialogue and thereby “socializing” them into the ideas of GPEI 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2011, 170).  
The cost-effectiveness of GPEI has been a continuing matter of discussion. 
Some authors believe that the large amounts of funding could better be spent 
on other diseases. And indeed, Shiffman has shown that a disproportionate 
amount of funding is spent on polio given its relative negative impacts vis-à-
vis other diseases (2006). Nevertheless, other analyses of GPEI shows that 
even though costs have increased substantially, the overall result is highly 
cost-effective compared to common routine vaccinations (Duintjer Tebbens et 
al. 2010; Aylward et al. 2003). Net incremental benefits for the partnership 
between the years 1988 to 2035 has been estimated to US$ 40 to 50 billion in 
net present value of which 85 % have been achieved in low-income countries 
mainly from preventing the cases of paralysis caused by polio (Duintjer 
Tebbens et al. 2010). Funding remains a problem, however. GPEI still suffers 
from lack of resources and weak management at some parts of the 
organisation. Weak implementation of Supplementary Immunization Activities 
(SIA) also led to lower political support in the four countries which still suffer 
from polio including India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Afghanistan (Aylward and 
Tangermann 2011). For the 2013 – 2018 period, there is still a funding gap of 
US$ 563 million (GPEI 2014).  
What lessons can be drawn for our study. An analysis of the GPEI presented in 
the Lancet in 2003 drew six lessons from the partnership process: first, goal 
setting should be based on technically sound strategies that can operate on 
large geographical scope; second, it is important to create buy in from an 
“appropriate international forum” before launching the partnership to ensure 
sustainable financing and commitment; third, when substantial local 
engagement is needed, there needs to be sufficient capacity on the ground to 
make this happen which could be facilitated by the partnership’s 
management; fourth, a sound financing mechanisms and burden-sharing 
model should be devised; fifth, international health goals should be designed 
within current health systems to receive support; and sixth, laggards should 
be identified early in the process to assist in capacity building and resources 
(Aylward et al. 2003). To reach all children, large support was given by private 
sector, military, transport and information ministries (ibid.). Coordination of 
the partnership was created by setting up operations on international, 
regional and local levels. The most resource intensive activity, the National 
Immunisation Days (NIDs), was made possible due to vast input from 
volunteers. 
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EITI 
No. 3 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Homepage http://eiti.org/ 
Year established 2002 
Headquarter Oslo (2003-2006: London); staff in secretariat: 19 
Function Standard-setting 
Funding Funding comes from supporting countries (45%) and supporting companies 
(55%); costs of validation of EITI compliance are born by countries being 
validated. Total costs for international management (including staff) are 
approx. 3 million $US pa. 
Reporting Country reports (candidate and compliant countries) are published on 
website; funding information and accounting available; no annual reports of 
EITI; EITI board meeting minutes available. 
Founding partners UK Department for International Development (DFID); companies from the 
extractive industries sector; civil society organisations  
Background The late 1990s saw an increased academic interest in the “resource curse”, 
discussing how the availability of oil, gas and mining resources was linked to 
poverty, underdevelopment and corruption. By the year 2000, a number of 
civil society organisations (e.g. Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, and 
Oxfam) had placed the issue of resource revenues and transparency on the 
international agenda. Supported by specific business interests (e.g. George 
Soros Open Society Initiative implemented a “Revenue Watch” programme), 
momentum was building up for a multi-stakeholder-based initiative. Around 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the UK 
Government (i.e. DFID) organised a meeting bringing together key 
stakeholders from the extractive industries sector and civil society 
organisations. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the approach in a 
written speech for the WSSD. In 2003, a conference was convened in London 
to agree on a set of principles for what would become the EITI. 
Before EITI was established as an independent organisation headquartered in 
Oslo, Norway, it was hosted by DFID in London (2003-2006). In 2013, at the 
global EITI conference in Sydney, the new EITI Standard was adopted, 
replacing the older EITI rules. The new standard is expected to address a 
number of shortcomings in the EITI process that have been identified in 
previous assessments (see below).  
Results As of 2014, 27 countries are in full compliance with the EITI standard, while 
17 countries have candidate status (and thus need to prove compliance 
through validation with an 18 month period). Out 44 EITI countries, 35 have 
produced a report according to the EITI rules. Beyond these basic data on 
standard-uptake and compliance, a limited number of studies show concrete 
impacts on the ground.  
For example, in a 2011 evaluation of EITI carried out by Reite and colleagues 
(2011), the author found evidence of concrete outputs and outcomes 
attributable to EITI in Gabon, Mongolia and Nigeria. However, the analysis 
concludes that while EITI has created links to broader governance reform 
processes within countries, it is not a significant driver for change. The overall 
assessment prevailing in the academic literature (e.g. Aaronson 2011; Haufler 
2010) is that the EITI has been influential in placing the idea of resource-
related transparency on the agenda of policy-makers and business actors 
while broader impacts on corruption and development in specific countries 
are hard to establish. The 2013 review and update of the EITI rules (now the 
EITI Standard) is a direct reaction to these shortcomings. 
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Analysis A number of factors have been identified that explain the observed 
performance of the EITI to date. First, contributing to its broad acceptance 
and visibility in global debates about resource-based corruption and 
transparency, EITI has successfully built a functioning multi-stakeholder 
structure with clear roles and responsibilities. Particularly important here is 
leadership and strategic vision of the EITI board as well as transparent 
procedures for selecting representatives of all stakeholders. Also the funding 
structure, in which supporting countries and business actors have an equal 
responsibility for supporting the EITI international secretariat, has 
contributed to a stable multi-stakeholder initiative. 
 
However, a number of limitations have also been identified, in particular 
linked to EITI’s limited impact on broader policy reforms. First, the 
effectiveness of the EITI approach is based on the ability of the national multi-
stakeholder group to actively engage with their government in sharing 
information about resource-related payments. Capacity and willingness of 
public actors to support the EITI process are important obstacles here. 
Second, the effectiveness of EITI is also limited by varying levels of support 
from civil society. On the one hand, EITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative that 
gives CSO’s voice and influence. On the other hand, many international 
campaigning CSO’s think of the EITI as a second-best solution and lobby for a 
hard-law approach to the problem. Third, while the EITI secretariat is found 
to effectively perform its role of supporting implementation countries in the 
EITI process, it has been less successful in training the broader public in how 
to use the EITI reports. In other words, the EITI has been lacking a broader 
theory of change that would guide its strategic decisions. The recent revisions 
of the EITI Standard are a reaction to this shortcoming. On this account, the 
EITI has proven to be flexible and adaptive in the context of a fast-changing 
policy-setting.  
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REEEP 
No. 4 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) 
Homepage http://www.reeep.org/ 
Year established 2002 
Headquarter Vienna, Austria 
Function Service provision/Implementation 
Funding REEEP is funded by government contributions; as of 2012/2013, REEEP has 
received contributions of around 4.5 million EUR (of which 3.8 million 
earmarked); the largest contributors (as of 2013) are Germany, Norway, UK, 
Switzerland and Ireland. 
Reporting A number of documents (audit reports and annual reports) are available from 
the project website; however, the latest full annual report is from 2009/2010. 
Founding partners Government of UK together with business and CSO partners; Margaret 
Beckett, then UK Minister for the Environment announced the initiative to 
form REEEP at the summit’s closing session.  
Background REEEP was launched as a public-private partnership at the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). The United Kingdom was the 
initiator of the Partnership and the main driving force in its functioning since 
the earliest stages. The preliminary arrangements for the founding of a new 
partnership in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sector were made 
in early 2002, with the UK and Indonesia and UNIDO as first major partners. 
Nine other governments expressed their interest in the new initiative at this 
stage (among them Austria, India and Norway, key governmental partners 
today); fourteen others were invited. Efforts were made to acquire several 
important partners from the private sector, including businesses (e.g. Shell, IT 
Power, UK Business Council on Sustainable Energy, BP) and CSOs (WWF, 
Greenpeace) as well as IOs (ASEAN, UNEP, IEA). The initial provisions expected 
$500,000 of UK funding for the temporary coordinating Secretariat, to be 
supported by other donors at later stages. From January 2003 until May 2004, 
REEEP was hosted within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In June 
2004, REEEP obtained formal, legal non-profit status as a non-governmental 
organisation under Austrian law. In the ten years since its inception, the 
organisation has grown to comprise 385 Partner organisations including 45 
governments as well as a range of private companies and international 
organisations. REEEP is a market catalyst for clean energy in developing 
countries and emerging markets. In this role, it acts as a funder, information 
provider and connector for up-scaling clean energy business models. 
Results As of 2014, REEEP has supported more than 180 clean energy projects in 58 
countries, disbursing €18.6 million and leveraging an additional €36.3 million 
in co-funding. 
In its 9th funding cycle, REEEP has awarded €3.95 million to 28 clean energy 
projects in 19 countries. The 10th cycle is currently in preparation.  
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Analysis A number of studies (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2011; Pattberg et al. 
2010) have scrutinized REEEP’s success and reported four decisive factors: 
institutional design; the high level of trust and commitment; the monitoring 
and verification scheme; and networking with other partnerships. 
 
REEEP’s organisational structure including governance and decision-making 
has been referred to as an important prerequisite for success. REEEP’s main 
governance bodies are the Governing Board (minimum 6 members, broadly 
representative of key stakeholders and respecting regional variation), the 
Finance Committee (representing all REEEP donors above an annual 
contribution of 70.000 EUR), the Programme Board (consists of regional 
renewable and energy efficiency experts and donors and decides on the 
programme priorities), the Steering Committee (representing regional 
stakeholders), the International Secretariat (headquartered in Vienna with a 
staff of 11) and the Regional Secretariats (acting in six regions, contractually 
bound to provide local support to REEEP). 
 
A second important success factor is the high level of support (in particular in 
the start-up phase) of a dedicated government (in this case UK) that 
committed concrete resources (both human and financial) to the project 
(Pattberg et al. 2009). 
 
Third, REEEP has developed a tight monitoring mechanism that guarantees 
that project funding is spend responsibly and with the greatest possible 
effect. All projects need to submit quarterly reports, containing outputs, 
impacts as well as detailing the timings, risks approach and media activity for 
each project alongside a financial review. These reports are reviewed and 
recommended by Regional Secretariats and sent to the International 
Secretariat, which makes a decision regarding acceptance of progress and 
payments. When a project is completed, a final report on the whole initiative 
and finances is submitted, often prepared with the help of external experts 
and auditors. After a set period of time a general impact assessment is 
conducted to examine the value of the project and its contribution to the 
more general goals (climate change mitigation, MDGs, future replication and 
regional scaling-up). 
 
Fourth, REEEP has been successfully establishing working relations with other 
organisations and partnerships in the field, effectively setting up a feasible 
division of labour and sharing of resources. Important partner organisations 
are REN21, the Global Village Energy partnership (GVEP), and the Global 
network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD). A concrete 
example for effective resource sharing is the clean energy info portal REEGLE 
that is jointly produced by REN21 and REEEP (see: http://www.reegle.info/). 
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CCAC 
No. 5 Climate and Clean Air Coalition to reduce short-lived climate pollutants (CCAC) 
Homepage http://www.unep.org/ccac/ 
Year established 2012 
Headquarter Hosted at the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Paris, 
France 
Function Knowledge transfer 
Funding UNEP is hosting a CCAC Trust Fund to different initiatives. Pledges for 2012 to 
2015 amount to approximately US$ 46 million of which US$ 29 million has 
been deposited with UNEP. In total US$ 12 million were allocated to project 
initiative by October 2013 (CCAC 2013).  
Reporting The reporting of the CCAC’s activities is scarce. Beyond an executive summary 
of a 2012-2013 Annual Initiative Progress Report, the homepage includes few 
detail on for example the progress of the initiatives, projects, allocation of 
money, source of funding, state of the problem, or tangible results.  
Founding partners Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, Mexico, Sweden and the United States, along 
with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 
Background Increased attention to climate change coupled with a global gridlock in the 
multilateral negotiations and increased understanding of the impacts of 
short-lived pollutants (SLCP) in the atmosphere, such as black carbon, 
methane and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), led a number of governments 
together with UNEP to establish the CCAC. Due to their strong climate forcing 
and relatively short life in the atmosphere, SLCPs were seen as an opportunity 
to mitigate climate change in the short-term (Ramanathan and Carmichael 
2008).  
Results Since the CCAC it still in making is it difficult to attribute any direct effects or 
signs of behavioural change among its partners. There are also few articles on 
the initiative and the public information is scarce. 
 
The CCAC has become a popular initiative, growing from seven partners at its 
inception in 2012 to over 80 partners in 2014. To pick this ‘low hanging fruit’ 
the voluntary partnership CCAC was created in 2012 and today comprise the 
worlds’ richest countries, including the G8 (Department Of State 2013), and 
have attracted high-level politicians to its the meetings. The capacity is 
therefore substantial and Blok and colleagues’ estimate that the CCAC could 
realize half of the technical mitigation potential resulting in 1 Gt CO2 eq (2012, 
474), making it a potentially highly effective ICI. 
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Analysis Since there are few results, also the analysis is difficult to really substantiate. 
Besides attracting much media and political attention, with the result of more 
partners joining the group, the CCAC also produced a number of informative 
and authoritative reports on different aspects of SLCPs, including mitigation 
options. A partnership structure is in place and a number of key issue areas 
have been identified such as cooking-stoves. 
 
Based on the building blocks identified in the study, a number of observations 
can be made. 
 
First, even though tracking and creation of inventories are core functions of 
the CCAC (CCAC 2012a) the CCAC lacks ambitious and precise targets. It is 
therefore difficult really assess the effectiveness of the partnerships. The 
governance of the CCAC is heavily built around voluntary participation 
without binding commitments to targets or provision of funding (CCAC 
2012a). This voluntary character is clearly reflected in the initiatives to reduce 
SLCPs which form the backbone of the CCAC’s work including actions on for 
example heavy duty diesel vehicles and engines, agriculture, household 
cooking and domestic heating. An analysis of the fact sheets that explain each 
initiative shows the centrality of soft action such as capacity development, 
networking, show of best-practices, and awareness-raising. Only the initiative 
on heavy duty diesel vehicle and engines aim to attain “quantifiable and 
significant” reductions of SLCPs (CCAC 2012b). In this sense, the CCAC clearly 
lacks the instruments and governance structure to be held accountable (at 
least on the short-term).According to the building block on “goal setting”, 
precise and ambitious targets were conducive for a successful outcome, 
however, at the moment, the CCAC lacks these preconditions.  
 
Second, regarding partners, the CCAC displays an impressive array of 
developed and developing nations, and non-state organizations from 
research, environmental CSOs, and sub-national governments. Even though 
international organizations such as UNEP and the World Bank hold core 
positions in the partnership, the CCAC is clearly state-driven. However, the 
framework agreement of the CCAC shows the open attitude towards non-
state actors. The CCAC is open for cooperation with non-state partners and 
their participation in high-level events, however, they are not allowed to vote 
on certain core functions (Lode 2013). The voluntary nature of the CCAC 
increases the chances of creating an equitable distribution of burdens and 
benefits since partners needs to agree on measures among themselves rather 
than in a general assembly with democratic voting rules.  
 
Finally, emissions of SLCPs have effects on climate change and air quality and 
are partly a result of the combat against ozone-depleting substances. 
Consequently, some SLCPs are regulated internationally by the UNFCCC, 
LRTAP and the Montreal Protocol, while others are not regulated at all. The 
CCAC therefore fills a niche in the institutional architecture of global climate 
governance by coordinating action and cooperation across the regimes. In its 
framework document, the CCAC recognizes the central importance of the 
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
 56  
    
 
UNFCCC to mitigating climate change (CCAC 2012a). In this sense, the CCAC 
represents a adds to the ‘cooperative fragmentation’ (Biermann et al. 2009) 
of the global climate regime by adding to the number of institutions and 
decision-making procedures but being loosely integrated with the UNFCCC, 
and the core institution does not include the all countries that are important 
to the issue area, in this case China. 
 
Overall, the CCAC lack many of the elements we have identified as necessary 
for a successful partnership. The current constellation of (state) actors 
appears to be committed to the task but there is no way to say whether the 
partnership would survive a large set-back, for example, a shift in government 
among key players such as the US. Stakeholders are participating on an 
unequal basis. Reporting and monitoring is lacking. It also lacks clear and 
precise goals, several of the key countries such as China, a clear and well-
structured funding-mechanism, an independent secretariat with adequate 
number of personnel, and its position in the governance architecture of 
climate change is unclear.  
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GFP 
No. 6 German Food Partnership (GFP) 
Homepage http://germanfoodpartnership.com/ 
Year established 2012 
Headquarter http://www.germanfoodpartnership.de/ 
Function Implementation 
Funding Funding for the secretariat (hosted by the German Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) is provided by the BMZ; specific funding 
is available from the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH 
(DEG). 
Reporting No information in reporting provided. 
Founding partners German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
and a group of German businesses and associations; in-kind or –n-cash 
contributions by participating companies. 
Background The German Food Partnership is a network of government agencies and 
international businesses from the agriculture and food industry sector (with 
participation from CSOs and science) to promote food and nutrition security in 
developing countries and emerging economies. The overall aim of GFP is to 
improve food and nutrition security by increasing the quality or quantity of 
food. Concrete projects focus on market needs or existing bottlenecks for the 
provision of food. The GFP has developed out of concerns about how to 
address the food related MDGs in the context of German development policy. 
Results The GFP is a rather new initiative that has only recently started to implement 
concrete local projects. 4 broader topics (related to broader international 
initiatives) can be identified: GFP oilseeds; GFP African Potatoes; GFP Rice 
Asia; and GFP Rice Africa. Due to many projects still being in the planning 
phase, concrete results are scarce. Observable are a number of planning 
workshops to define concrete project goals and to get partners at one table.   
Analysis The GFP displays a number of important features related to the building 
blocks discussed above. 
First, concrete criteria for membership have been developed to ensure a focus 
and long-term commitment to sustainable development. Participating private 
companies, associations, development banks, and foundations active in the 
food sector must regards sustainable development as a long-term 
commitment; engagement in partner countries needs to be long-term and go 
beyond identifying suppliers and customers; projects are gender-sensitive. 
Secondly, next to these requirements for membership, participating business 
organisations also have to comply with UN Global Compact Principles and the 
BMZ criteria for private sector cooperation.  
Thirdly, each project must address seven issues (in the broader normative 
context of a global right to food): access to land; sustainable investments; 
access to genetic resources; sustainable production and processing; food 
safety; nutrition security; and empowerment and participation for farmers 
(and their interest organisations). This broad and holistic approach is a very 
good example for how partnerships, by bringing in the appropriate partners, 
can move beyond the silo-approach and come to a more system-oriented 
perspective. 
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Fourthly, the GFP requires sound monitoring practices and reporting for each 
project. Concrete indicators shall be developed by the project participants 
(usually a German development agency and a minimum of two companies 
across multiple countries). Indicators are also envisaged to be aligned with 
national development strategies of the implementation countries. 
Finally, GFP has identified concrete roles and responsibilities for each type of 
partner, which makes the management of expectations easier.  
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